network operational data for cyber security research.
concerns, in this paper we propose three schemes to flexiData generated by security systems may include sensiblyperform alert anonymization. These schemes are closely tive information (e.g., IP addresses of compromised servers) related but can also be applied independently. In Scheme that data owners do not want to disclose or share with other I, we generate artificial alerts and mix them with original parties. It is always desirable and sometimes mandatory to alerts to help hide original attribute values. In Scheme II, anonymize sensitive data before they are shared and correwefurther map sensitive attributes to random values based lated. To address this problem, existing approaches [9, 19] on concept hierarchies. In Scheme III, we propose to parusually perform transformation to sensitive data. Fox extition an alert set into multiple subsets and apply Scheme ample, Lincoln et al. [9] proposed to use hash functions and II in each subset independently. To evaluate privacy proteckeyed hash functions to anonymize sensitive attributes such tion and guide alert anonymization, we define local privacy as IP addresses. Their approach is effective on detecting and global privacy, and use entropy to compute their values.
high-volume events, but may have limitations on alert correThough we emphasize alert anonymization techniques in lation if different keys are introduced in keyed-hashing. We this paper, to examine the utility ofdata, wefurther perform [ 19] are sanitized, and they may further infer organizations' privacy policy.
Introduction
In this paper, we address this problem in another complementary direction. We start to hide original sensitive values through injecting more data into data sets. We also perTo defend against large-scale distributed attacks such asg g form transformation to sensitive attributes, but this is carworms and distributed denial of service attacks, it iS USU-. ally desirable to deploy security systems such as intrusion ned over the same attribute domains. In this paper, we prodetection systems (IDSs) over the Intemet, monitor difpose three schemes to anonymize sensitive attributes of inferent networks, collect security related data, and perform trusion alerts. These schemes are closely related and may ferent networks, collect security related data, and perform as eapididpnety nShm ,w netoal analysis to the collected data to extract useful information. In addition, different organizations, institutions and users generate artificial alerts and mix them with original alerts, thus given any alert in the mixed set, it is not clear that this alert is original or artificial, which means its attributes may *k The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their or may not be real. During artificial alert generation, we valuable comments. This work iS supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under grants ITR-0219315 and CCR-0207297, and preserve frequency distributions of attack types and nonby the U.S. Army Research Office (ARO) under grant DAAD19-02-sensitive attributes, while using concept hierarchies to fa- [4, 12] . These methtificial alert has the same format as that of an original ods model each attack through identifying its prerequisite alert. However, artificial alerts are synthetic, and may be and consequence, and matching consequences with prereqgenerated by a human user, or some programs. Similarly, uisites among different attacks to build attack scenarios. (3) a type T anonymized alert has the same format as that Approaches based on known attack scenarios [11, 5] . These of an original alert. However, sensitive attribute values in approaches build attack scenarios through matching alerts anonymized alerts are transformed (e.g., through randomto known scenario templates. (4) Approaches based on mulization) to protect data privacy. As an example, if DestIP of tiple information sources (e.g., [14] Intuitively, artificial alert injection generates synthetic from our previous method [12] , where the probabilities realerts and mixes them with original alerts. The critical islated to the matching of prerequisites and consequences sue here is how to generate attribute values for artificial among different attacks are estimated. Though it is closely alerts, with both privacy and utility requirements in mind. related to the optimistic approach in [19] , the probability esWe divide alert attributes into three classes: alert types, sentimation here is based on our anonymization schemes.
sitive attributes, and non-sensitive attributes, and discuss The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Figure 1 , the least common parthe dependence between different attributes (e.g., the depenent of two leaf nodes 172. 16 tion from malicious users, which in some sense may protect the desirable general values for these IP addresses are the data privacy. However, on the other hand, if we try to make corresponding /24 network addresses. We first compute the artificial and original alerts very difficult to distinguish, or frequency distribution of these generalized attribute values data utility is our favorable concern, we can also maintain attribute dependence in artificial alert generation. We proalert has a probability m+n to be original. Based on probapose two ways to get dependence relationships. (1) Manbility theory, randomly pick up k alerts in the mixed set, the ually collect all dependence relationships through various probability that at least one alert is original is 1-( mn )k.
means. For example, based on attack signatures, and host
As an example, let m = 1000, n = 300 and k = 2, then configurations, we can know the hosts and ports that some the probability that at least one alert is original is 94.67%, attacks are targeting. (2) Compute conditional probabilities while the probability that both alerts are artificial is only between attribute values based on original alert sets, and fol-5.33%. This tells us that when the ratio ofthe number of arlow these conditional probabilities to generate attribute valtificial alerts to the total number of alerts is small, it is very ues in artificial alert sets. This approach is similar to the likely that some alerts in an alert subset are original even if data-swapping technique proposed by Reiss [15] . We also this subset is small. Closely investigating these small subagree that complex dependence relationships (e.g., between sets may disclose the privacy of alert data. This problem alert types and timestamps) are worth future research.
may be mitigated by injecting more artificial alerts. In the To see how well our anonymization schemes can proextreme case, if we inject a much larger number of artificial tect alert data privacy, we classify alert data privacy into two alerts (i.e., m «< n), then in a randomly selected k-alert sublevels: localprivacy and globalprivacy. Local privacy is reset, the probability that at least one alert is original may be lated to original attribute values in each individual alert. Invery small even if k is big. Notice that with the increase of tuitively, if the original value for a sensitive attribute in an the number of artificial alerts, the utility of mixed data sets alert has been known, the local privacy for the sensitive atmay be decreasing, and more overhead is introduced to antribute in this alert is compromised. where vg has L leaf nodes). For example, based on the is a possible value for As in S, and P(vi) is the correspondconcept hierarchy in Figure 1 , we may randomize a sensiing probability. Notice that the distance between PMFs and tive attribute DestIP=172. [12] . In ues in both alerts t1 and t2. Based on the prerequisites, the the method [12] , each alert type is associated with its preconsequences, and the available non-sensitive values, we requisite and consequence, where the prerequisite of an atknow that t1 prepares for t2 only if t1 and t2 have the same tack is the necessary condition for the attack to be successoriginal destination IP addresses. For simplicity, assume ful, and the consequence of an attack is the possible outthat the original values of DestIP are uniformly distributed come if the attack succeeds. We use predicates to reprefrom 172. 16 To evaluate the effectiveness of our techniques, we did a Based on the above observation, we realize that we can set of experiments to evaluate our anonymization schemes, only identify possible prepare-for relations after attribute similarity estimation and building correlation graphs. The randomization. To characterize this observation, we propose data sets we used are 2000 DARPA intrusion detection sceto associate a probability value to each possible prepare-for nario specific data sets [10] . These data sets were collected relation when building attack scenarios from anonymized in simulation networks and include two scenarios: LLDOS alerts. Notice that sometimes precisely computing the prob-1.0 and LLDOS 2.0.2. Both scenarios have two data sets ability that one alert prepares for another is difficult becollected over different parts ofthe networks: the inside part cause analysts do not know probability distributions of origand the DMZ part. In LLDOS 1.0, the attackers first probed inal attribute values. However, as we mentioned in Subsecthe network, then launched buffer overflow attacks against tion 3.1, we can get lower bound probability values under vulnerable Sadmind services, next installed DDoS software the assumption of uniform distributions. We take advantage on victim hosts, and finally ran DDoS attacks. LLDOS 2.0.2 of this observation and define possibly-prepare-for relation.
has a similar scenario as in LLDOS 1.0. We used RealSeFormally, given two anonymized alerts t 1 and t2, tl possicure network sensor 6.0 to generate alerts from the data sets. blypreparesfor t2 with at least probability p if (1) the probSimilar as done by DShield, we set attribute DestIP (destiability that t1 prepares fort2 is no less than p, and (2) p > 0.
nation IP addresses) in all alerts as sensitive attribute, and Our probability based approach is closely related to our preanonymized them using the schemes in this paper. vious approach in [19] . However In the second set of experiments, our goal is to see the as a graph. For convenience, we may use prepare-for reeffectiveness of attribute randomization using Scheme II. lations to represent either prepare-for relations, possiblyWe applied Scheme II to all four mixed data sets generated prepare-for relations, or both in the rest of this paper.
in the first set of experiments. Specifically, we randomized Lower-bound probabilities related to prepare-for relaeach DestIP in mixed data sets to its 256-peer node (Any IP tions may also be used to "polish" alert correlation graphs. address in its /24 network).
Actually if we take a close look at how we compute these
In the third set of experiments, our goal is to evaluate probability values, the basic problem involved is to decide the effectiveness of Scheme III. we applied Scheme III to how possible the related attributes have the same original all four mixed data sets. Specifically, we randomized each values. In some cases, we can estimate precise probabilDestIP in mixed data sets to its 256-peers. In addition, we ity values. However, in some other cases, for example, two set time interval I = 1 hour to partition data sets. Conseanonymized attributes are in the same subset and have the quently, we got 4 subsets for LLDOS 1.0 Inside alert set, same anonymized values, we usually may assume uniform 4 subsets for LLDOS 1.0 DMZ alert set, 2 subsets for LLdistribution to get lower-bound probability values. Since DOS 2.0.2 Inside alert set, and 2 subsets for LLDOS 2.0.2 prepare-for relations are identified through this probability DMZ alert set. based approach, it is natural that some prepare-for relations To see how our anonymization schemes may protect data may not be true. A common way to filter out false prepareprivacy, we computed local and global privacy values for all for relations is to examine their related (lower-bound) probthree sets of experiments. These privacy values are listed in abilities. Ifthe probability is greater than a given probability Table 1 . (Notice that we also plotted the PMFs of attribute threshold, we keep it in the correlation graph, otherwise we DestIP, but due to space constraint, we do not list them in remove it. Though our approach on polishing alert correlathis paper.) tion graphs may help us remove false prepare-for relations, Based on Table 1 , we noticed that (1) through Scheme we also notice that it has a chance to prune true prepare-I, we can better protect alert privacy because both local for relations. It is necessary to examine both alert correlaand global privacy values increase. For example, in LLtion graphs with and without probability-polishing to under-DOS 1.0 inside part, we injected around 15% of artificial LLDOS ships, but they can be found in [13] (Tables III and IV Figure 2 , the string inside each node is the alert type Scheme III: Rmc 10.01% 8.27% 6.58% 4.32% followed by an alert ID. For comparison purpose, we also Table 2 . Similarity estimation built the correlation graph from the original data set, where the nodes in this scenario are those without gray-color marking in Figure 2 . For all those gray nodes, the ellipse alerts among all alerts, and local privacy increases from 0 nodes are in original data sets, while the rectangle nodes to 0.620, and global privacy increases from 4.696 to 5.692.
are artificial alerts. The attack scenario in Figure 2 is con-(2) Through Scheme II, local privacy has significantly insistent with the real attack scenario involved in this data set. creased, which is highly desirable, and global privacy stays
In Figure 2 , we observed that artificial alerts and false almost the same, which results from consistency keeping alerts may be involved in alert correlation graphs. To furduring randomization. And (3) after applying Scheme III, ther measure the quality of alert correlation graphs, we comlocal privacy stays the same, and global privacy further inputed two measures recall Mr andprecision Mp for all four creases, which results from independent randomization in data sets, where we let i = # detectedattacks and each subset.
# rulettTereu tsare attack.s in the real scenariot re# alerts The results are shown in Table 3 .
In Table 3 , the number of alerts in the correlation methods are the number of alerts in the correlation graphs. From Table 3 [19] , we also
